João Fonseca



Webpage: http://www.ifl.pt/main/Pessoas/JoãoFonseca/tabid/107/Default.aspx
Email: jfonseca.ifl@fcsh.unl.pt


Research Interests 

  • Empirical Truth-Conditional Semantics
  • Neurorepresentation and Neurosemantics
  • Philosophy of Science and Neuroscience

Education
  • PhD Philosophy, New University of Lisbon.
  • MA Philosophy, New University of Lisbon.
  • Lic. Philosophy, New University of Lisbon.

Presentations

  • (2009). “Estará a Filosofia da Mente a Prejudicar o Progresso Neurocientífico?” 3.º Oficina de Filosofia Analítica. Portuguese Society of Philosophy, 26 Jan.
  • (2008). “On the Non-Elimination of Mental States by Adopting a Ruthless-Reductive Stance”. Reduction and the Special Sciences. Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, 10 Apr.
  • (2007). “Is Philosophy of Mind Holding Neuroscience Back? The Case of Fear”. Emotion, Cognition and Communication. Philosophy of Language Institute, New University of Lisbon, 20 Dec.
  • (2006). “Ruthless Reductionism vs. New Mechanism on Reductive Explanation and Neuroscientific Discovery”. ENFA 3. University of Lisbon, 3 Jun.
  • (2005). “Semantic Minimalism and Communication” (with João Sàágua). 5th European Congress for Analytical Philosophy. University of Lisbon, 28 Aug.
  • (2005). “Contextualism, Minimalism and Communication”. Meaning and Communication. New University of Lisbon, 4 Jun.
  • (2004). “Uma Abordagem Anti-Realista em Favor da Redução Psico-Neuronal”. ENFA 2. University of Porto, 9 Oct.
  • (2004). “Representação, Cognição e Sistema Nervoso”. Estudos Avançados sobre o Conceito de Representação. New University of Lisbon, 3 Jun.
  • (2004). “Neurorepresentação”. Philosophy of Language Institute, New University of Lisbon, 30 Jan.
  • (2003). “A um Cérebro Minimal Corresponde uma Racionalidade Minimal?” Linguagem, Conhecimento e Racionalidades. New University of Lisbon, 4 Nov.
  • (2003). “Active Externalism and Psychoneural Reduction”. Where is Your Head At? Mental Processes, Communication and Rules. Vietri sul Mare, 2 Oct.
  • (2003). “Philosophical Anatomy of Emotions (poster)” (with Dina Mendonça). Emotion and the Brain III; Basic Research and Clinical Applications. Lusophone University of Humanities and Technologies, 30 May.
  • (2002). “Reducionismo e Evolução Científica: Uma Nova Perspectiva”. ENFA1. University of Coimbra, 18 May.
  • (2002). “Aspectos Filosóficos das Neurociências”. Philosophy of Language Institute, New University of Lisbon, 12 Apr.
  • (2002). “Neurorepresentação e Neurocomputação - A Naturalização da Mente”. Philosophy of Language Institute, New University of Lisbon, 14 Feb.
  • (2001). “Donald Davidson, Realist or Instrumentalist?: The Role of Consciousness in Mental States Ascriptions”. Mind and Action III: The Explanation of Human Interpretation. New University of Lisbon, 25 May.
  • (1998). “Reply to Evnine”. Philosophy of Language Institute, New University of Lisbon, 10 Sept.

Publications

  • (2009). “Ciências Cognitivas, Representação e Cérebro”. In Pires Aurélio, D. (ed.), Actas do Seminário de Estudos Avançados sobre o Conceito de "Representação". Lisbon: Edições Colibri.
  • (2009). "Verdade Mente e Acção" (with Luiz Baptista and João Sàágua). Lisbon: Edições Colibri.
  • (2008). “On the Non-Elimination of Mental States by Adopting a Ruthless-Reductive Stance”. PhilSci Archive.
    Link
  • (2006). “De uma Semântica Conceptual para uma Neurosemântica: Apresentação e Discussão Crítica da Contenda Fodor & Lepore vs Paul Churchland a Propósito da Noção de Similaridade de Significado”. Análise II:2, 71-94.
  • (2006). “Uma Abordagem Anti-Realista Contra a Reformulação do Problema Mente-Corpo Segundo uma Perspectiva Reducionista-Interteórica”. In Miguéns, S., Pinto, J. A. e Mauro, C. (eds.), Analyses: Proceedings of the 2nd National Meeting for Analytic Philosophy, 124-33. Porto: Faculty of Letters, University of Porto.
  • (2005). “Donald Davidson on Mental States, Realism and Neuroscientific Explanation”. In Sàágua, J. (ed.), A Explicação da Acção Humana: Proceedings of Mind and Action III, 271-280. Lisbon: Edições Colibri.
  • (2004). “On Bickle’s Failure to Give a Formal Account of the Location in the New-Wave Reductionist Spectrum”. Disputatio I:17, 65-73.
  • (2004). “A um Cérebro Minimal Corresponde uma Racionalidade Minimal?” Cadernos de Filosofia 14, 35-53.
  • (2003). “Reducionismo e Evolução Científica: Uma Nova Perspectiva”. In Ribeiro, H. J. (ed.), ENFA1, 173-83. Coimbra: Faculty of Letters, University of Coimbra.
  • (2003). Review of Churchland's Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. Cadernos de Filosofia 13, 79-87.
  • (2001). “Indeterminação da Tradução” and “Relatividade Ontológica". In Branquinho and Murcho (orgs.), Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-Filosóficos. Lisbon: Gradiva.
  • (2000). “Interpretation, Semantics and Indexicality (or How One Thing Led to Another)”. Cadernos de Filosofia 7, 37-64.
  • (1999). “Comentário a Evenine: Será Davidson um Empirista sob Pele de Cordeiro?”. Cadernos de Filosofia 6, 35-39.
  • (1999). Review of Churchland's The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cadernos de Filosofia 5, 143-60.
  • (1997). Review of Geofrey Hunter's Metalogic: An Introduction to the Metatheory of Standard First Order Logic. Cadernos de Filosofia 2, 135-40.
  • (1997). Review of Bechtel and Abrahamsen's Connectionism and the Mind: An Introduction to Parallel Processing in Networks. Cadernos de Filosofia 2, 141-47.